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ABSTRACT: Recently, South Korea experienced two strongest earthquake events in its modern history, 
i.e. 2016 Gyeongju (Mw 5.4) and 2017 Pohang Earthquakes (Mw 5.5). In the region generally considered 
as a low or moderate seismic zone, the occurrences of such earthquakes and their socio-economic 
consequences alarmed the general public. Moreover, those earthquake events featured a number of main- 
and after-shocks, which raised a significant concern about potential major catastrophes caused by multi-
hazard effects. This paper presents a probabilistic framework being developed to assess such multi-
hazard risk of nuclear power plants (NPPs). First, a ground motion prediction equation is represented by 
a Bayesian Network (BN). The relationship between main- and after-shocks, e.g. the modified Omori 
law is incorporated into the BN. Second, to overcome limitations in existing Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment (PRA) of NPPs, which often employs event tree and fault tree analysis, the BN representing 
the multi-hazard is connected with the fault trees constructed for the NPP. Finally, to address the impact 
of structural damage caused by earlier shocks on later events, the fragilities of NPP components are 
updated. These updated fragilities are incorporated into the fault trees connected with the BN for accurate 
after-shock risk assessment. The proposed methodology integrates our knowledge on the multi-hazard 
(BN), reliability of NPP (fault tree) and inter-hazard effect (system identification). The proposed 
framework is demonstrated by an NPP under main- and after-shock scenarios. Potential applications to 
other types of multi-hazards and future research needs are also discussed. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
For a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) of 
nuclear power plant (NPP), the risk metric for a 
specific hazard, i.e. earthquake, can be calculated 
by convolution of system fragility and hazard 
curves. The hazard curve can be derived by 
probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA) to 
determine the annual probability of exceedance as 
a function of intensity measure, i.e. peak ground 
acceleration (PGA). Then, the fragility curve of 
each component in the NPP system is determined 
by computing the conditional probability of 
failure as a function of given intensity measure. 
The fragility curves can incorporate various 
uncertainties because of the use of available 
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physical model, empirical, experimental, and/or 
numerical data. In this PRA, the plant-level risk 
can be calculated by incorporating fault and event 
trees generally with components’ fragility curves.  
Current PRA frameworks in use focus on 
estimating the risk about each type of hazard 
separately. One of the main reasons why multi-
hazard scenarios have not been considered is that 
the probability of simultaneous occurrence of two 
different hazards such as earthquake and 
hurricane is extremely rare. However, it is noted 
that the possibility of occurrence of closely-
related multiple hazards is relatively high and may 
result in significant damage or a major disaster. 
For example, the great Tohoku earthquake and 
flooding caused by the seismic sea wave resulted 
in the catastrophe at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
plant (Aoki and Rothwell, 2013). This disaster 
alarmed decision makers and stakeholders of 
various infrastructures worldwide, which is 
subject to multi-hazard risk. Recently, South 
Korea experienced two strongest earthquake 
events in its modern history, i.e. 2016 Gyeongju 
(Mw 5.4) and 2017 Pohang Earthquakes (Mw 5.5). 
Those areas are generally known as low or 
moderate seismic zones, but the occurrences of 
such earthquake including a number of main- and 
after-shocks raised a significant concern about 
potential major catastrophes caused by multi-
hazard effects. 
In this research, a probabilistic multi-hazard 
risk assessment framework is developed for NPP. 
To this end, first, after a literature survey on multi-
hazard risk, the main- and after- shock is selected 
as a practical multi-hazard example for which the 
multi-hazard assessment can be developed. The 
selected multi-hazard is then modeled by 
Bayesian Network (BN). BN is a probabilistic 
graphical tool, and has been used as a decision-
making tool for a variety of natural and man-made 
hazards. To establish the relationships between 
random variables in BN, the ground motion 
prediction equation (GMPE) proposed by Boore 
and Atkinson (2008) is adopted. By constructing 
the BN based on the GMPE, a probabilistic 
inference can be made regarding the multi-hazard 
effects. Two GMPE-based BNs for main- and 
after-shock are connected through the modified 
Omori law (Yeo and Cornell, 2009; Llenos and 
Michael, 2017), which has been used by a number 
of researchers to model aftershock rates 
immediately after the occurrence of a main-shock. 
Finally, the multi-hazard model can be 
constructed by BN, GMPE, and modified Omori 
law. 
Although this BN constructed to model the 
multi-hazard can effectively represent the 
probability distribution of PGA, it cannot be 
simply extended to assess the multi-hazard risk of 
NPP due to the complexity of the NPP system. On 
the other hand, the currently used PRA approach 
can estimate the risk about single hazard, but it has 
not been utilized for multi-hazard. Therefore, to 
develop a multi-hazard PRA method having the 
merits of the both approaches, the BN is 
connected with the main methodologies of PRA, 
i.e. the fault and event tree, which represent the 
relationship between components in the NPP 
system. 
After providing theoretical backgrounds on 
BN, GMPE, modified Omori law, and fault-tree-
based PRA, the paper will present the proposed 
multi-hazard risk assessment framework. Next, 
the proposed framework will be tested for several 
scenarios of main- and after-shock sequence. 
Finally, the paper is concluded with a summary 
and future research topics. 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUNDS 
In our efforts to construct a new multi-hazard risk 
assessment framework for NPP, a literature 
survey about multi-hazard risk assessment was 
first conducted as summarized below. 
Kameshwar and Padgett (2014) presented a 
parameterized fragility based multi-hazard risk 
assessment procedure for a portfolio of highway 
bridges subjected to earthquake and hurricane 
events. Coupling between the risk assessment 
procedure and the parameterized fragilities 
enables a comparative assessment of the 
contributions of different hazards to the total risk. 
However, in this research, the two hazards are not 
considered as concurrent, and thus the total 
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probability is estimated by the summation of 
probabilities of two hazards. Kwag and Gupta 
(2017) proposed a Bayesian-network-based 
approach for probabilistic safety assessment of a 
nuclear facility. Because the BN enables us to 
consider general relations between various hazard 
events and conduct beyond-design-vulnerability 
assessment, the inference using BN makes it 
feasible to evaluate real-time risk for multi-hazard 
by accommodating field inspection data as 
observation for BN. However, this research also 
assumed that the likelihood of multi-hazard 
consisting of earthquake, wind, and flood is low.  
On the other hand, there has been research 
efforts to consider causal relationship between 
sequential hazards. In a study to evaluate 
appropriate percentages of design snow load (Lee 
and Rosowsky 2006), the effect of snow load was 
incorporated into the seismic fragility analysis. 
Espinoza et al. (2016) presented a multi-phase 
resilience assessment framework that can be used 
to analyze any natural threat that may have 
multiple and/or continuous impact on critical 
infrastructures. These research efforts dealt with 
multi-hazard effects with focus on correlation or 
causal relation with short elapsed time between 
hazards. 
To conduct practical risk assessment of NPP 
with multi-hazard effects of main- and after-shock 
sequence considered, it is important to develop an 
effective probabilistic model for the seismic 
hazard. In addition, the PRA of NPP should be 
able to incorporate the impact of structural 
damage caused by a main-shock on the after-
shock damage by updating the fragility. To 
address these, the following background theories 
are used in the proposed framework. 
2.1. Bayesian Network 
Bayesian Network (BN) is a probabilistic 
graphical tool, which can describe random 
variables and their probabilistic relationship by 
using nodes and arcs, respectively. Each node in a 
BN is associated with a discretized probability 
distribution with a specific number of intervals. 
On the other hand, an arc represents probabilistic 
dependency of a child node on its parent nodes by 
Conditional Probability Table (CPT). There also 
exist BN methodologies that can model 
continuous random variables without 
discretization (Fenton and Neil, 2012; Lee and 
Song, 2017). Once a BN is constructed, full joint 
PMF about all random variables can be evaluated 
by multiplication rule. Then, using available 
marginalization algorithms, one can eliminate 
variables in the constructed full joint PMF to 
obtain the marginal PMF for each random 
variables in the BN model. Through this 
probabilistic inference process of BN with pre-
calculated CPTs, the BN can provide efficient 
probabilistic inference for general selections of 
observed and unobserved nodes. 
The BN methodology has been applied to 
various engineering areas including computer 
science, diagnosis engines, decision support 
systems, and social sciences, because of the 
following merits. First, a BN provides a graphical, 
powerful, and efficient tool for modeling complex 
systems consisting multiple components having 
uncertainties. Second, a BN allows for efficient 
probabilistic updating and assessments of each 
component and system performance. Lastly, the 
BN’s graphical feature can help engineers or 
decision-makers to understand the current states 
of random variables and interdependencies 
between variables intuitively and visually. 
Recently, making use of these merits, Bensi et al. 
(2011) modeled multiple hazards on infrastructure 
systems by a BN with their interdependencies 
considered and extended the BN by including the 
utility as decision nodes. In this paper, the main- 
and after-shock sequence is modeled by BN based 
on the ground motion prediction equation and 
modified Omori law. 
2.2. Ground Motion Prediction Equation 
In PRA of an NPP, the final risk of the target 
system is calculated by convolution of the system 
fragility and the hazard curve. Especially, to 
derive the hazard curve, we need to conduct 
PSHA, which combines the probabilities of all 
earthquake scenarios with different magnitudes 
and distances in order to compute seismic hazard 
at a site. PSHA often uses an GMPE, i.e. an 
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empirical model to estimate ground motion 
intensities at the site. A general form of GMPE is 
expressed as 
ln𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝑓(𝑀𝑗 , 𝑅𝑖𝑗 , 𝜃𝑖) + 𝜎𝑖𝑗𝜀𝑖𝑗 + 𝜏𝑗𝜂𝑖𝑗 (1) 
where Yij denotes the selected ground-motion 
intensity measure, e.g. peak ground acceleration 
(PGA) at site i for the earthquake event j, 
f(Mj,Rij,i) is the attenuation law to predict the 
median value of Yij given as a function of Mj 
(magnitude of event j), Rij (seismological distance 
to site i in earthquake j), and i (a set of other 
explanatory variables assigned at site i). The 
random variable ij is the intra-event residual to 
represent site-to-site uncertainty within the same 
event j while j is the inter-event residual to 
represent event-to-event uncertainty. Finally, the 
parameters ij and j represent the standard 
deviations of the intra- and inter- event residuals, 
respectively. 
There are various GMPEs using different 
attenuation laws, and PSHA usually incorporates 
uncertainties in ground motion prediction, by 
considering multiple GMPEs. Then, those 
GMPEs are integrated with probability 
distribution conditioned on parameters in GMPEs 
to derive the final hazard curve. More details of 
PSHA can be found in Yeo et al. (2009). This 
PSHA process require good understanding about 
earthquake at the specific site, and proper 
selection of GMPEs with corresponding several 
conditional probability distributions. 
Apart from the selection problem, it is not 
easy to describe the whole process of PSHA using 
BN, because the corresponding BN would be 
highly complex because of numerous nodes 
representing selections of GMPEs. Therefore, the 
BN model in this study utilizes a single GMPE 
model (Boore and Atkinson 2008) to derive 
probability distribution of PGA based on given 
information such as magnitude or distance of 
occurred earthquake. 
2.3. Modified Omori Law 
It has been generally observed that several 
earthquakes occur as a cluster within a limited 
period of time and confined to a limited interval 
in space. The main-shock is generally defined to 
be the main event representing the earthquake, 
which shows the largest magnitude among events 
in the sequence. Immediately following the 
occurrence of a main-shock, the rate of occurrence 
of the after-shocks is at its maximum, and then 
decreases. In order to achieve a multi-hazard 
framework addressing such relationship between 
main- and after-shocks, this study adopts the 
modified Omori law as follows. 
The statistical records indicate that the 
occurrence rate of the after-shocks should be 
represented by a power-law, which is generally 
referred to as the modified Omori law, i.e. 
     pMmMba ctMt   )(10,  (2) 
where (t,M) denotes the mean daily rate of 
aftershocks with magnitude M or larger at time t 
after main-shock with Mm, a and b are the 
productivity parameter and the slope of the 
magnitude-frequency distribution respectively, 
and c and p are so-called Omori-Utsu parameters 
characterizing a particular after-shock sequence 
with specific main-shock. These constant values 
can be estimated by regression with earthquake 
data in a specific period (Lienos and Michael, 
2017). The modified Omori law has been used by 
a number of researchers to model after-shock rates 
immediately after the occurrence of main-shock. 
For example, 62 California after-shock 
sequences with main-shock magnitudes Mm 
greater than 5.0 were fitted to the modified Omori 
law using the maximum likelihood method. The 
mean after-shock rates were described by the 
modified Omori law and the Gutenberg-Righter 
relationship. As  a result, “generic California 
model” (Llenos and Michael, 2017) was 
developed. Actually, the after-shock sequences 
data from two strongest earthquake events in 
South Korea are not enough to be fitted to the 
modified Omori law. So, in this paper, the values 
of Omori-Utsu parameters (c, p), productivity 
parameter (a), and slope (b) in the California 
model are adopted in numerical examples. 
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2.4. Fault Tree Analysis 
As discussed above, PRA of NPP often 
incorporates fault and event trees generally with 
components’ fragility curves. These curves are 
convoluted with the hazard curve to evaluate the 
plan-level risk. The event trees are essential for 
plant-level risk assessment, but only fault tree are 
utilized in this study to propose a new framework.  
A fault tree diagram is a graphical 
decomposition of an undesirable event 
representing system failure into intermediate 
events and basic events through the use of logical 
gates, e.g. AND and OR gates. The basic events 
are represented by Boolean states, which mean 
“failure” or “safe” state generally. These basic 
events are linked to the logical gates to 
characterize intermediate events. These events 
can be connected to other logic gates as well. 
Through the fault tree analysis (FTA), the 
minimal cut-sets of system can be identified in the 
form of a fault tree. 
Actual fault trees used in current practice of 
PRA of NPP have been designed mostly for single 
hazard such as an earthquake event, and such a 
fault tree cannot be used for other types of hazard, 
i.e. flood, hurricane, etc. In addition, the basic 
events of a fault tree represent components of the 
system, each of which is modeled by fragility 
curves. These fragility curves are also derived for 
single earthquake event. So, therefore, it is noted 
that the current FTA used in NPP is not able to 
deal with multi-hazard effects. This creates a 
significant limitation for the entire process of 
PRA including event and fault tree. Therefore, an 
alternative framework utilizing the current 
process of PRA is proposed as shown in the next 
section to facilitate multi-hazard PRA of NPP. 
3. PROBABILISTIC FRAMEWORK FOR 
MULTI-HAZARD 
By describing ground motion prediction equation 
and modified Omori law of main- and after-shock 
multi-hazard in a Bayesian Network framework, 
and combining the BN with fault tree analysis 
used in existing PRA methods, a probabilistic risk 
assessment framework is developed as follows. 
3.1. Bayesian Network for main- and after-shock 
Ground motion prediction equation (GMPE) 
proposed by Boore and Atkinson (2008) is 
modeled by a Bayesian Network (BN). Details of 
the selected GMPE can be found in the reference.  
First, the random variables M (magnitude of 
event), RJB (closest distances to the surface 
projection of the fault plane), and  (a set of other 
explanatory variables) in Equation (1) are selected 
as the nodes of the BN (See Figure 1). Specifically, 
  for the selected GMPE is shear wave velocity, 
Vs30. There are other variables often adopted as 
to characterize the earthquake hazard. For 
simplicity, however, such variable, e.g. fault type 
being strike-slip (“ST:SS” in Figure 1) is 
considered deterministic variable. Two additional 
deterministic variables are added as nodes in BN 
to represent the uncertainties in the intra- and 
inter-residuals. The target intensity measure in the 
GMPE, which is peak ground acceleration (PGA) 
in this study, is described as a child node (Y) of 
the deterministic and random nodes described 
above. It is generally known that BN has to be 
constructed based on causal relations between the 
nodes. The BN model described above represents 
the causal relation between the parent nodes (M, 




Figure 1: Bayesian Network model representing 
Ground Motion Prediction Equation (GMPE-BN) 
 
The constructed GMPE-based BN (GMPE-
BN) is then utilized to describe a main- and after-
shock sequence. This is accomplished by 
connecting GMPE-BNs  which are developed for 
main- and after-shocks separately. This 
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information in the modified Omori law as shown 
in Figure 2. Because the magnitude of main-shock 
influences on after-shock, the parameters a and b 
in Equation (2) are connected to the Mm. If an 
observation of Mm is available from the main-
shock event, the distribution of the mean daily rate 
of aftershock,  can be derived by inference. The 
distribution of magnitude for after-shock, MA.S, is 
then generated based on the updated  by 
sampling. Finally, GMPE-BNs for main- and 
after-shock can be constructed by above BN for 




Figure 2: Bayesian Network representing the 




Figure 3: GMPE-BN developed for sequential shocks 
(GMPE-BNSS) 
 
Basically, the GMPE-BN model in Section 
3.1 could be used for after-shock events as well. 
Instead of modeling and using GMPE-BN’s 
separately, the BNs developed for the main- and 
the corresponding after-shocks are connected 
through the BN model representing the modified 
Omori law (Figure 2) to describe the causal 
relation between the earthquake events in the 
sequence. Figure 4 shows the final BN structure 
describing main- and after-shock, termed as 
“GMPE-BN for sequential shocks (GMPE-BNSS)” 
for the rest of this paper. The GMPE-BNSS covers 
the multi-hazard modeling, and will be connected 
with the conventional fault-tree-based PRA 
framework as described in the next section. 
3.2. Bayesian Network Connected with Fault 
Tree Analysis 
The conventional PRA framework has limitations 
in its applications to deal with multi-hazard 
effects. However, it is difficult to modify the 
event- and fault-tree-based framework and the 
PRA-based practice. Therefore, the conventional 
PRA is rather connected with the proposed 
GMPE-BNSS in this study. As the first attempt of 
such approach, the proposed framework utilizes 
fault tree analysis only for simplicity. In this 
research, the target system is the Hanul NPP 
located at Ulchin in South Korea. Among several 
fault trees available for the Hanul NPP, the tree 
about ‘seismic-induced loss of essential power 
(LEP)’ is selected, and constructed by using 




Figure 4: LEP Fault Trees of NPP at Ulchin in South 
Korea 
 
The basic events in the LEP tree include 
seismic fragility curves. The probability of the top 
event is calculated by convolution of these 
fragility curves with the hazard curve. In this 
research, to be able to assess the risk of an 
ongoing multi-hazard event, the probability 
distributions of intensity measure is updated by 
the proposed GMPE-BNss, and convoluted with 
the fragility curves in PRA of NPP. Figure 5 
illustrates the proposed PRA framework that 
connects GMPE-BNss of main- and after-shocks, 
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Figure 5: GMPE-BNss connected with Fault Tree 
4. NUMERICAL INVESTIGATIONS 
This research utilizes some specific values for 
parameters in Equation (2) because the data from 
two recent earthquakes in South Korea do not 
provide enough information to estimate the 
parameters of the modified Omori law. Therefore, 
the information from generic California model is 
utilized. To test the proposed framework, a 
scenario about main- and after-shock is created by 
using the parameter values in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Parameters of main- and after-shock 
scenario for GMPE-BNss 





intra 0.502 - 
inter 0.260 - 
c 1.08 - 
p 0.05 - 
a Normal(-1.67, 0.12) - 
b Normal(0.91, 0.042) - 
 
In addition to 8 parameters listed in Table 1, 
the magnitude of main-shock is assumed as 0, 1, 
2, and 3. In calculating the failure probability 
using the fault-tree about the assumed scenario, an 
important assumption should be made regarding 
the seismic performance of the structures 
damaged during the main-shock event. To 
incorporate this point, the fragility of such 
structures need to be updated accordingly. To this 
end, system identification (SI), i.e. estimation of 
changes in system parameters based on 
measurement data such as acceleration or 
displacement, can be utilized. To obtain an 
effective SI method for this purpose, the research 
is currently underway to detect main-shock 
damage by use of Kalman or Particle Filter (Kim 
and Song, 2018). In this paper, to develop a 
prototype risk assessment framework, it is 
assumed that the fragility curves of all 
components in the LEP fault tree will increase by 
changing uncertainty index (Q) from 5% to 95% 
in the fragility (Kim et al., 2010). 
     UUm QAaaF  1/ln)(   (3) 
where a, Am, R, U, and Q are intensity measure, 
logarithmic standard deviation of inherent 
randomness and uncertainty, and index 




Figure 6: Numerical investigation using assumed 
increase of failure probabilities 
 
Figure 6 shows an example of multi-hazard 
risk assessment in which the fragility curves of the 
damaged components increase because of damage 
from main-shock. Then, the failure probabilities 
of top event of constructed fault tree are calculated 
about main- and after-shock sequentially when 
the magnitude of main-shock is 0, 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively. The calculated probabilities increase 
as the magnitude of main-shock increases. In 
addition, because of the increased fragility of 
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probabilities of after-shock are bigger than those 
of main-shock in LEP, whose components are 
vulnerable to low magnitude. If there is no 
damage in each component, the failure 
probabilities for after-shock (MM = 1, 2, and 3) are 
0.0081, 0.0087, and 0.0092 respectively. Except 
for MM=1, the probabilities for after-shock are 
smaller than those for main-shock, because the 
magnitude of after-shock is small generally.  
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Because of the limited applicability of 
conventional probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) to 
multi-hazard phenomena, e.g. main- and after-
shock sequences, the ground motion prediction 
equation-based Bayesian network representing 
sequential shocks (GMPE-BNss) is proposed and 
connected with fault tree as the first attempt of 
developing a practical risk assessment framework 
for multi-hazard. In the proposed framework, only 
fault tree is exploited for simplicity, but both 
event- and fault trees will be connected with 
GMPE-BNss finally in future research.  
The numerical investigations demonstrate 
that the proposed methodology can evaluate the 
risk of sequential shocks while considering causal 
relationship between main- and after-shocks, and 
the impact of main-shock-caused damage on 
after-shock fragility. In particular, to address the 
latter, the fragility curves are increased for 
components damaged by main-shock. Although 
the fragility curves are increased by arbitrarily 
changing an index in this research, filter-based 
system identification (SI), which can identify 
changed system parameters from given output 
data of structures, is expected to help incorporate 
the effect into the proposed framework. By 
incorporating an effective SI method, the 
proposed framework is expected to facilitate 
practical multi-hazard risk assessment for 
complex engineering systems such as NPP. 
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